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Abstract  
This paper analyses the role of political connections in the post-entry performance of private start-up 
companies in China. It documents robust evidence that political affiliation enhances firms’ survival 
and growth prospects, even if politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster productivity improvements. In 
addition, the benefits of political connections are largely confined to firms associated with local or top 
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In spite of improving legal protection for private firms, market-supporting mechanisms are still weak in 
China, and private entrepreneurs suffer from political and institutional discrimination. In response to 
these market and institutional failures, a sizeable proportion of private entrepreneurs in China adopt the 
so-called “red hat strategy”: forging close political ties with local, regional and central governments. 
However, there are those who fear that the alliance between business and the body politic is likely to 
foster rent seeking among entrepreneurs and cadres, and reduce the competitiveness of the market. 
 
This research paper tries to understand the role of political connections on the post-entry performance 
of private start-up companies in China. It documents robust evidence that political connections 
enhance firms’ growth and survival prospects, although politically neutral firms enjoy faster efficiency 
improvements. The close association between the state and a segment of the business community is 
thus leading to sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy by interfering with the process of market 
selection. 
 
So more than a quarter of a century after Deng Xiaoping’s famous pronouncement that the colour of 
the cat does not matter as long as it catches mice, it seems that the cat in a red hat is somewhat more 
privileged than the one without. Growing calls for a level playing field are likely to be heard in the future, 





Uncertainty in the policy making process creates substantial transaction costs for 
firms  (Williamson,  1991;  Henisz  and  Zelner,  2004).  Consequently,  business 
organisations engage in political behaviour to internalise these costs and influence the 
policy process in ways favourable to them. Corporate political strategies such as lobbying 
and  party  contributions  are  widely  employed  by  US  firms,  and  these  have  been  the 
subject of many academic studies (e.g. Stratmann, 2003 and Drazen et al., 2007).  The 
political sophistication of large European firms and their role in shaping the EU policy 
agenda is also documented (Coen, 1997).  
The current paper is concerned with political strategies adopted by firms in China. 
A significant number of private owned enterprises adopt the so called “red hat” strategy 
by  seeking  political  affiliation  with  the  Communist  Party  and  various  governmental 
entities. Some scholars see this strategy as a means of circumventing problems associated 
with  the  lack  of  secure  property  rights  and  institutional  discrimination,  such  as  the 
lending bias of China’s state dominated banking system against indigenous entrepreneurs 
(Li, 1999; Huang, 2003), heavy government regulations and extralegal fees (Johnson et 
al,  2000;  Guriev,  2004).  This  view  is  consistent  with  the  “helping  hand”  theory  of 
government business relationship (Che and Qian, 1998).  However, theory also predicts 
that government bureaucrats tend to be more interested in rent seeking, extraction and 
political objectives rather than corporate efficiency and maximising firm value. This is 
known as the “grabbing hand” hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
Given  that  politics  and  business  have  always  been  interrelated,  it  is  perhaps 
surprising to observe that there is a paucity of work analysing the corporate performance 
implications  of  political  connections.  The  few  studies  in  this  area  include  Fisham’s 
(2001)  estimation  of  the  value  of  political  affiliations  to  firms  in  Indonesia  and  the 
analysis  of  Leuz  and  Oberholzer Gee  (2006)  on  the  financing  strategy  of  politically 
connected Indonesian firms. For Malaysia, Johnson and Milton (2003) uncover a strong 
positive  correlation  between  stock  market  performance  and  political  connections  in 
Malaysia in the presence of capital controls. Using a survey of 3259 private enterprises in 
China in 2002, Hongbin et al (2007) find that Communist Party membership of private 2 
entrepreneurs is important to firm profitability, especially in regions with weaker market 
institutions.  
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to contribute to this sparse literature by 
evaluating the effects of political connections on the survival and growth prospects of 
newly formed private enterprises in China. Our study is based on more than 106,000 
private  firms  that  entered  the  market  between  1999  and  2004,  23%  of  which  are 
politically affiliated with government at some level. We argue that China is a particularly 
interesting country for studies of political connections and firm performance for three 
main reasons. 
 First, in spite of its ever increasing importance to the economy in the post reform 
era,  the  private  sector  had  been  lacking  proper  legal  protection  or  even  official 
recognition.  It  was  not  until  1999  that  the  National  People's  Congress  introduced  an 
amendment to the constitution stipulating that the non state sector is an integral element 
of the socialist market economy. In a remarkable U turn, the Communist Party is now 
actively encouraging domestic capitalists to join its ranks (Guiheux, 2006).  It is therefore 
interesting  to  see  how  this  newfound  alliance  between  the  political  elite  and  (some) 
private firms is shaping market dynamics in this important emerging economy.  
Second, in spite of a centralised political system, China’s process of economic 
liberalisation has been highly decentralised, with various levels of governments having 
autonomous  policymaking  powers  within  their  jurisdictions.  In  this  regard,  it  can 
reasonably be hypothesised that firms affiliated with higher levels of government (e.g. 
central and regional) are likely to enjoy better political protection, securer property rights 
and  easier  access  to  bank  loans.  However,  as  Li  (1999)  and  Qian  (2003)  observed, 
although lower level (i.e. local) governments have less leverage to protect enterprises 
under their jurisdiction, they have more incentive to make them as efficient and profitable 
as possible. This is because under China’s system of fiscal federalism, local governments 
have no subordinate governments to extract revenue from and their interests are sharply 
aligned with those of local businesses. The case of China thus offers useful variation in 
the  type  of  political  connections  that  can  be  exploited  to  identify  heterogeneous 
relationships between political behaviour and economic performance. 3 
 Third,  China’s  WTO  (World  Trade  Organisation)  accession  stipulates  several 
compulsory provisions on government relationships (Li, 2003), including the absence of 
discriminatory economic policy. In this respect, it is important to determine the extent to 
which political cronyism is distorting market mechanisms. If the business environment in 
the country is not providing a level playing field for all markets’ participants, it is not 
only politically unaffiliated domestic firms that would be discriminated against. Foreign 
firms in China’s trading partner countries are also going to loose out in light of China’s 
ever deeper integration into the world economy. Thus, a study of the business politics 
nexus  in  China  has  wider  implications  beyond  the  narrow  confines  of  the  domestic 
political economy sphere. 
Our econometric analysis  yields five major conclusions: (i) political connections 
significantly enhance firms’ survival prospects; (ii) conditional on survival, firm growth 
is faster for politically affiliated firms; (iii) conditional on survival, politically unaffiliated 
private firms perform better in terms of productivity  growth; (iv) the benefits due to 
political connections are largely confined to firms associated with local and high levels of 
government; and (v) the effects of political connections are more pronounced in capital 
intensive industries where firms require a wider range of resources  for their growth, and 
the “helping hand” of government is presumably needed more.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution of 
private firms government relationship in China. Section 3 presents the empirical model, 
and Section 4 describes the data set used in the analysis. The main findings of the paper 
are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Private firms and the body politic in China 
 
In the first decade of the reforms (1978 88), the legal framework governing the 
private  sector  was  rather  shaky.  Although  private  firms  were  accorded  some  official 
recognition   their existence was formally sanctioned in the 1982 Constitution   they were 
not viewed as an integral part of the economy (Young, 1989) and lacked genuine legal 
and property rights. This is perhaps best crystallised by Article 11 of the Constitution 4 
which  stipulates,  “the  state  guides,  assists  and  supervises  the  individual  economy  by 
administrative control." Furthermore, private firms were not allowed to hire more than 
eight workers (e.g. Li, 2007), presumably because of Karl Marx's categorisation in Das 
Kapital of producers employing eight or more workers as exploitive capitalists (Guiheux, 
2006). 
It  was  not  until  April  1988  that  Article  11  of  the  Constitution  was  amended, 
laying down that “the state guarantees the rights and interests of the private economy in 
conformity  with  the  law.”  The  process  of  official  recognition  continued  with  the 
introduction in 1999 of a new modification to the Constitution which stipulates that "the 
private economy and other forms of the non state economy are important components of 
the socialist market economy". The insertion in 2004 of an article in the constitution that 
guarantees that "the lawful private property of citizens is inviolable"  marked for the first 
time  in  the  history  of  modern  China  the  endorsement  of  the  legal  status  of  private 
property. 
In 2003, the private sector accounted for 59.2% of the value added generated in 
China and employed 196.2 million people
1. The sector’s contribution to the prosperity of 
the  country  is  praised  by  the  political  hierarchy,  and  private  entrepreneurs  are  now 
courted by the Chinese Communist Party (Guiheux, 2006). The country has indeed come 
a long way from the time of the Cultural revolution when entrepreneurs were prosecuted 
as “tails of capitalism” (Young, 1989). However, in spite of improving legal protection 
for private firms, market supporting institutions are still weak in China. Indeed, private 
entrepreneurs still suffer from political and institutional  discrimination (Young 1995; Li 
et al., 2007). Li et al (2006) documents evidence that private entrepreneurs’ response to 
market  and  institutional  failures  is  to  engage  in  political  behaviour—the  strategy  of 
“wearing  a  red  hat”.  A  study  conducted  in  2002  revealed  that  80  percent  of  the 
entrepreneurs  surveyed  had  become  members  of  the  party  before  starting  a  business 
(Guiheux,  2006).  Other  ways  entrepreneurs  participate  in  politics  include:  serving  as 
delegates  in  local  or  national  People's  Congresses,  contesting  elections  for  local 
administration posts and joining business associations that link the state and the private 
sector (Guiheux, 2006). Part of the reason for joining the political hierarchy is easier 
                         
1 Source: OECD Economic Surveys: China (2005). 5 
access to resources such as land and bank credit, information on regulations and new 
policies, and protection from competition (see for example Li et al., 2007). 
   Yet another way in which firms engage in political behaviour is affiliation with 
some level of government administration. A large number of private enterprises in China 
have political connections with governmental bodies whose functions include offering 
credit guarantees and political protection in return for “management fees” (Huang, 2003). 
Broadly  speaking,  firms  can  be  politically  affiliated  with  five  different  levels  of 
government  (e.g.  Li,  2004).  These  are  (in  decreasing  order  of  hierarchy):  central, 
provincial,  prefecture,  county  and  township  (local)  governments.  The  relationship 
between different levels of government has been shaped by the revenue sharing system 
(fiscal federalism). The system requires lower level governments to hand over a fixed 
amount of their revenue to the higher tier of government. Since township governments 
have no lower level governments from which to extract revenue, their main sources of 
income are the firms under their jurisdiction. Thus, it is expected that local governments 
have more incentive to support productive non state enterprises. As Qian (2003) and Li 
(2004) observe, fiscal federalism has aligned the interests of local governments with local 
business, implying that it might pay off for private firms to be affiliated with their local 
governments.  However, it is also reasonable to suppose that firms associated with higher 
levels of government (i.e. central and provincial) are likely to enjoy better protection and 
more privileges  e.g.  access to export and import licences,  favourable bank loans  and 
lucrative public contracts.   
There are those who fear that the alliance between business and the body politic is 
likely  to  foster  rent  seeking  among  entrepreneurs  and  cadres.  This  will  reduce  the 
competitiveness of the market. As Dickson (2003) argues, “red capitalists” have little 
incentive for structural changes that favour the private sector as a whole. 
   
3.  Econometric specification  
 
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  empirical  strategy  to  identify  the  effects  of 
political behaviour on the post entry performance of private firms in China.  We estimate 
two types of models: a nonlinear model of the probability of firm exit and linear models 6 
of firm and productivity growth. Firm growth is defined as employment growth, which is 
a standard measure in the industrial economics literature. As a measure of productivity, 
we  consider  total  factor  productivity  because  it  is  widely  accepted  to  be  the  chief 
determinant of long run growth.  
 
Modelling the impact of political behaviour on firm survival: 
We  model  the  probability  of  firm  exit  using  a  hazard  rate  specification.  The 
hazard or the probability of exit for firm i in period t, conditional on having survived up 
to that point  is expressed as 
( ) D P X t h P X t h it it i δ γ β + ′ + ′ = − − 1 1 0 exp ) ( ) , | (                             (1) 
where  ) (t ho is the baseline hazard. We choose a flexible specification for the baseline 
hazard and employ the Cox proportional hazard model, which imposes a proportional 
characteristic specific shift on the baseline hazard. 
In  the  above  equation,  P  is  a  vector  of  3  binary  variables  indicating  the 
government level (high, middle and local) the firm is affiliated with. Start ups without   
political connection are the base group. D is a set of time, sectoral and regional dummies 
and X is a vector of control variables. In line with the empirical literature (see Geroski, 
1995) we include firm size (measured by employment), age and productivity as control 
variables. It appears to be a stylised fact that larger, older and more efficient plants have 
better survival prospects than smaller, younger and inefficient ones. We also hypothesise 
that firms that are export oriented, enjoy access to finance and are engaged in innovative 
activity, have lower likelihood of market exit. The vector X also includes three industry 
level variables, namely industry exit and entry rates and industry concentration. In all 
cases, lagged values of the covariates are used to mitigate concerns about endogeneity. 
Table 1 gives the  precise definition of the variables used in the econometric analysis.  
Another  source  of  concern  in  the  estimation  of hazard  models  is  the  issue  of 
unobserved heterogeneity.  As shown by Lancaster (1990), unobserved heterogeneity, if 
neglected,  would  bias  the  proportionate  response  of  the  hazard  to  variation  in  each 
regressor  at  any  survival  time.  For  this  reason,  we  estimate  the  hazard  model  with 
unobserved heterogeneity that follows a gamma distribution. 7 
 
The impact of political affiliation on firm and productivity growth: 
In order to isolate the impact of political  affiliation on  firm growth, we estimate the 
following model:   
                            it it it it it D P Z Y ε δ γ β + + ′ + ′ = − − 1 1                                    (2)            
  The  dependent  variable  Y  denotes  either  firm  (employment)  growth  or  total 
factor productivity growth, P and D  are defined as in Equation (1), Z is a vector of 
covariates hypothesised  to impact on firm growth, f is a term capturing firm specific 
heterogeneity and ε is a random error term. In the above model, Z consists of exporting 
intensity,  innovation  intensity,  age,  access  to  finance,  initial  size  /  productivity  and 
industry concentration. 
There is a large body of empirical evidence that finds firm (productivity) growth 
has a negative relationship with initial size (productivity), suggesting convergence in firm 
size (e.g. Geroski, 1995). The positive correlation between performance and exporting 
has been widely documented across a number of countries, including China (see Kraay, 
1999). The growth enhancing effects of innovation and labour quality have also been 
recognised in  the  literature  (e.g.  Gort  et  al,  1993  and  Jovanovic,  1982). By  contrast, 
higher market concentration is generally believed to have a detrimental impact on firm 
performance.  The finance growth  nexus is well  researched  in  the  economic  literature 
(Levine, 2005). Some theoretical models predict that firms with debt contracts tend to 
grow faster than otherwise similar firms (e.g. Aghion et al, 1999).  In these models, debt 
is hypothesised to reduce the amount of free cash to managers, giving them the incentive 
to reduce managerial slack and seek innovative ways to boost efficiency.     
A  potentially  serious  estimation  problem  is  that  the  growth  variables  are,  by 
definition, only observed for firms that have survived up to a particular point in time. It is 
therefore important to correct for selection bias due to survivorship. A prominent method 
for correcting selection bias is due to Heckman (1976). However, this technique does not 
deliver consistent estimators in panel data settings. Fortunately, Wooldridge (1995) has 
extended  Heckman  (1976)’s  method  to  linear  panel  data  models,  and  we  use  this 
extended estimator to identify the selectivity corrected effects of political behaviour on 8 
firm growth and performance. The variables included in the selection equations are the 
same as those used in the survival model described above. 
Recall that in the baseline model the political connection variables are lagged by 
one  period  so  that  they  are  predetermined  with  respect  to  the  growth  variables. 
Nevertheless, we also investigate the merits of a GMM estimator that explicitly controls 
for  the  potential  endogeneity  of  political  connections.  To  this  end,  we  made  an 
exploratory analysis on the determinants of political connection. The marginal effects 
from two probit regressions are reported in the Appendix. We first estimate a model with 
firm level variables only, and the results suggest that politically affiliated firms tend to be 
larger at birth, have higher initial productivity and enjoy greater access to finance. These 
firm level variables in the probit regressions cannot serve as exogenous instruments since 
they are also part of the set of control variables in the growth regressions. When we next 
add a variety of regional and industrial characteristics to the model, the predictive power 
of  the  probit  model  increased  significantly  (to  nearly  80%  correct  predictions).  The 
regression estimates show that firms in a region with greater financial development and 
competition, presence of lawyers and intellectual property rights are less likely to engage 
in political behaviour. At the industry level, the share of the private sector has a negative 
relationship with the propensity of start ups to join the political bandwagon. We employ 
these  regional  and  industry  characteristics  as  exogenous  instruments  for  the  political 
connection  variables  in  the  GMM  estimations  and  ascertain  their  validity  using  the 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. 
 
4.   Database description 
Our econometric analysis draws on the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSB).  The report covers 
the population of state owned enterprises and all non state firms with an annual turnover 
of  over  five  million  Renminbi  (just  above  $600,000).  It  is  estimated  that  the  firms 
contained in the data set account for about 85 90% of total output in most industries. The 9 
NSB performs several logic tests to ensure the accuracy of the information in the report 
and identify illogical data.
2 
The data set includes information on firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, 
geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output, product innovation, 
R&D, value added, net fixed assets, exports, R&D and employee training expenditures.
3  
The data set available to us spans the period 1999 to 2005, and comprises more than 1.3 
million  firm year  observations.  It  is  worth  noting  that  we  used  the  whole  sample  to 
construct industry level variables (e.g. industry entry and exit rates). However, in view of 
the  objective  of  this  paper,  the  econometric  work  is  confined  to  the  new,  private, 
domestic owned enterprises that entered the market. The NSB assigns to each firm in the 
database  a  categorical  variable  indicating  ownership  status.  Nevertheless,  it  is  also 
possible to construct a continuous measure of ownership composition from the database 
by  looking  at  the  fraction  of paid in  capital contributed  by  state, private  and  foreign 
investors. Using this measure of ownership, we define a firm as being private if it is not 
in receipt of any state funds or foreign investment and private individuals are majority 
investors in the firm. 
A firm is defined to be a new entrant at time t if its establishment year is given as 
time t and it is observed in the database for the first time at time t. This tight definition 
helps  avoid  measurement  error  problems  in  the  establishment  year  variable.  A  nice 
feature of the database is that it maintains a unique enterprise identifier irrespective of the 
dynamics of ownership change. This feature is useful when it comes to distinguishing 
private firms that  are liquidated (i.e. exited the market) and those that have experienced 
ownership  change  (e.g.  acquired  by  foreign  investors).  A  firm  is  designated  to  have 
exited the market at time t+1 if it is observed at the time t or earlier, but not in subsequent 
periods.   
We identified 106,718 private entrants over the period 1999 2004 that have the 
necessary information for econometric estimation. Some quarter of a million observations 
on  these  firms  provide  the  basis  of  our  analysis.  Table  1  gives  the  definition  of  the 
                         
2 Different versions (in terms of coverage) of this data set are used by academics (e.g. Hu et al, 2005 and 
Jefferson et al. 2006).  
3  Nominal  values  are  deflated  using  industry specific  ex factory  price  indices  obtained  from  China 
Statistical Yearbook 2006. 10 
variables used in the analysis along with some summary statistics, while Table 2 tabulates 
the frequency distribution of entry by level of political affiliation and industry. About 
23% of new entrants are politically affiliated, and  more than  half of these  are associated 
with  local governments. 
 
5.  Main findings 
Does political affiliation affect firms’ survival probability? 
    Table  3  reports  the  econometric  estimates  from  the  proportional  Cox  hazard 
model  with  unobserved  heterogeneity.  Reassuringly,  the  coefficients  on  the  control 
variables of the hazard  model are broadly consistent with expectations. For example, 
larger, more productive and innovative firms enjoy higher survival probabilities and firms 
in highly concentrated industries face higher likelihood of exit. Also export activity and 
access to external finance enhances firms’ survival probability. 
The importance of political affiliation for the survival prospect of firms can be 
seen from the magnitude of the hazard ratio coefficients given in the second column of 
Table  3.  A  firm  that  is  affiliated  with  a  high  level  of  government  (i.e.  central  and 
provincial) faces a hazard rate that is only 62.6% of the hazard faced by a firm without 
political  association.  The  benefits  due  to  affiliations  with  local  and  middle  level 
governments  are  also  positive  and  economically  significant.    Figure  1  shows  the 
estimated  hazard  lines  by  level  of  political  connections,  and  it  is  evident  that  firms 
without political affiliation face higher probability of exit. Results in Table 3 indicate an 
inverted U shaped relationship between the level of government affiliation and its impact 
on  firm  survival.  This  is  also  demonstrated  in  Figure  1,  which  also  shows  that  this 
inverted U shaped relationship persists over time. Start ups associated with higher levels 
of government benefit the most, followed by those affiliated with local governments, with 
middle level governments conferring the least advantage on their protégées. This is in 
line with the conjecture discussed in Section 2. Incidentally, the four curves in Figure 1 
appear to be parallel, suggesting that the proportionality assumption underlying the Cox 
hazard model is quite plausible in our context. Finally, it is worth noting that the survival 
effects  of  political  affiliations  are  more  pronounced  in  capital intensive  industries. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, in a labour abundant country like China, the “helping hand” of 11 
government  is  more  effective  in  sectors  where  access  to  capital  is  relatively  more 
important.  
It is a stylised fact that new entrants are exposed to high risk of exit, especially in 
the first post entry year. As Geroski (1995) put it, “the most palpable consequence of 
entry is exit”. Influential theoretical models such as Javanovic (1982) and Pakes and 
Ericson  (1998)  predict  that  firms’  growth  and  survival  performance  depend  on 
expectations  about  their  own  efficiency  and  the  uncertainty  associated  with  this 
expectation. Having entered the market with some prior belief about their performance, 
start ups continuously update this belief based on their observed post entry efficiency. 
Depending  on  their  updated  knowledge  and  the  level  of  uncertainty  they  face, 
economically rational firms decide whether to grow, decline or exit the market.  In light 
of  this  discussion,  a  plausible  channel  through  which  political  connections  may  help 
enhance firms’ survival prospects is by reducing the uncertainty regarding the future.  
 
Firm growth and political behaviour 
Table 4 reports the selection bias corrected econometric estimates from the firm 
growth  model.  Conditional  on  survival,  smaller  firms  tend  to  grow  faster,  rejecting 
Gibrat’s  Law  and suggesting convergence in firm size. Exporting intensity, access to 
finance and innovation all have a positive impact on employment growth. In contrast, 
higher product market concentration and firm age have adverse growth effects. 
In line with the results from the survival regressions, we uncover evidence that 
political affiliation with higher levels of government is most beneficial for the post entry 
growth of start ups. Controlling for a host of variables affecting employment growth and  
survivorship bias, we find that firms in capital (labour) intensive sectors that are affiliated 
with  a  central  or  provincial  government  grow  3.4  (2.5)  percentage points  faster  than 
politically neutral firms. Affiliation with local governments also confers distinct, albeit 
less marked, advantage on firm growth. By contrast, the growth benefits associated with 
middle level of governments fall short of statistical significance.  
  This  finding  of  positive  correlation  between  political  behaviour  and  start ups 
growth is consistent with theoretical models that postulate internal uncertainty as a key 
driver of firm growth. Firms that receive political protection and all the attendant benefits 12 
in terms of access to resources get positive signals about their future prospects and grow 
larger as a result. On the other hand, because of greater uncertainty regarding their future, 
it takes longer for start ups without political masters to determine their optimal firm size. 
Consequently,  their  post entry  growth  rate  tends  to  be  lower  than  that  of  otherwise 
similar “red hat” firms.  
 
Does the productivity of politically affiliated firms grow faster? 
Table 5 reports estimates from the productivity growth model. The most striking 
finding is that, conditional on survival and a number of control covariates; private firms 
without political affiliations exhibit higher productivity growth than firms with political 
connections. The total factor productivity growth of start ups affiliated with central and 
provincial (middle level) governments is, on average, 1.7 (2.37) percentage points lower 
than  “pure”  private  firms.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  the  productivity  growth 
differential between start ups with and without political behaviour is smallest for firms 
affiliated with local governments.  In other words, amongst politically connected firms, 
those  affiliated  to  local  government  enjoy  the  highest  productivity  growth.  This  is 
consistent  with  the  notion  that  China’s  system  of  fiscal  federalism  has  been  more 
successful in aligning local business interests with those of local government than with 
those of higher levels of government. Alternatively, this finding can also be explained by 
the fact that local government has fewer firms per head under their protection, and might 
as a result be able to provide effective assistance conducive to efficiency improvement.  
A final explanation could be that since local government bureaucrats are subject to less 
frequent rotations than provincial or prefecture officials, their decision making process is 
subject to less acute time inconsistency problem (Huang, 2003).   
 
6. Conclusion2 
   This paper sought to understand the role of political connections on the post entry 
performance of private start up companies in China. It documents robust evidence that 
political connections enhance firms’ growth and survival prospects, even if politically 
neutral  start ups  enjoy  faster  efficiency  improvements.  So  more  than  a  quarter  of  a 
century after Deng Xiaoping’s famous pronouncement that the colour of the cat does not 13 
matter as long as it catches mice, it seems that the cat in a red hat is somewhat more 
privileged than the one without.  
Assessing the aggregate ramifications of political cronyism in China is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, in view of our finding that private firms with no political 
ties tend to exhibit faster productivity growth and yet are more likely to exit the market, it 
is safe to conjecture that the close association between the state and a segment of the 
business  community is leading to  sub optimal  resource  allocation in  the  economy  by 
interfering with the process of market selection. Growing calls for a level playing field 
are likely to be heard in the future, though almost certainly not from the red capitalists 
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Table 1 
Definition and summary statistics 
of key variables 
 
Variable  Definition  Mean 
(std. dev ) 
Size  Log of total number of employees  4.36 (0.064) 
Firm  growth   Year on year growth rate of total employment.  6.36% (0.490) 
Total  factor productivity 
(TFP) 
Total factor productivity (TFP) estimated using the Levisohn and 
Petrin, (2003) approach. 
0.036 (0.401) 
TFP  growth  Year on year growth rate of total factor productivity  growth.   2.28% (0.605) 
Age  Years since birth   2.17 (1.420) 
Export  Share of export sales in total sales  0.109 (0.286) 
Innovation   Share of   output involving new product and process divided by total 
output. 
0.023 (0.129) 
Finance   Domestic bank loans divided by total asset.  0.556 (1.567) 
Industry concentration  Three digit level Herfindhal index of concentration.   0.759 (0.115) 
Industry entry   Number of new entrants in industry as a proportion of total firms in 
industry. 
0.358 (0.140)  
Industry exit  Number of exitors in industry as a proportion of total firms in industry.  0.190 (0.052) 
High level political affiliation  Dummy for entrants that are politically affiliated with central or 
regional governments: (total number = 1,053). 
1.12% 
Middle level political affiliation    Dummy for entrants that are politically affiliated with middle level 
governments, i.e. prefecture and towns:  (total number = 8,983). 
9.91% 
Local  level political affiliation  A dummy variable for private firms politically affiliated with local 
governments: (total number = 12696). 
12.40% 
No political affiliation  Private firms with no political affiliation: (total number = 83,986).  76.57% 
Number of new entrants   106, 718   
Maximum number of  
observations used in the 
econometric analyses 
251179   
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Table 2 
Entry by private firms in the Chinese manufacturing sector, 1999-2004: 
Frequency distribution by political affiliation and industry 
 
  Level of political affiliation 
Two-digit industry classification  High  Middle  Local  None 
13-Food Processing*  60  825  988  5157 
14-Food Production*  34  337  343  1542 
15-Beverage Industry*  15  302  178  915 
16- Tobacco*  9  2  1  7 
17-Textile Industry*  64  737  1228  10325 
18-Garments and Other Fibre Products*  19  205  643  4135 
19-Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products*  4  76  258  2044 
20-Timber Processing*  10  185  467  2789 
21-Furniture Manufacturing*  3  47  142  965 
22-Papermaking and Paper Products*  16  253  373  2453 
23-Printing and Record Medium Reproduction*  22  124  185  1178 
24-Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods*  5  31  118  949 
25-Petroleum Refining and Coking  21  119  119  811 
26-Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 
74  940  1063  5459 
27-Medical and Pharmaceutical Products  37  403  181  1008 
28-Chemical Fibre  5  45  79  662 
29-Rubber Products*  8  74  115  786 
30-Plastic Products*  32  316  642  4149 
31-Nonmetal Mineral Products*  80  866  1152  6202 
32-Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals  14  408  458  3366 
33-Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals  33  240  374  1902 
34-Metal Products*  57  339  704  5319 
35-Ordinary Machinery  90  506  748  6240 
36-Special Purposes Equipment  76  356  395  3087 
37-Transport Equipment  87  354  472  3259 
39-Other Electronic Equipment   60  450  625  4769 
40-Electric Equipment and Machinery  80  228  219  1888 
41-Electronic and Telecommunications  29  121  67  804 
42-Instruments and meters  9  94  359  1816 19 
Total  1053  8983  12696  83986 
            Notes: 
a.  Authors calculations based on the database used in this paper. 
b.  The numbers preceding the industry description refer to the two digit codes used by the State 
Statistical Bureau of China. 




Political behaviour and firm survival: 
Hazard ratio estimates from Cox model with unobserved heterogeneity 




Productivity  0.899***  0.903***  0.895*** 
  ( 5.90)  ( 4.24)  ( 4.10) 
Size  0.774***  0.776***  0.770*** 
  ( 37.2)  ( 28.1)  ( 24.5) 
Age  1.026***  1.027***  1.025*** 
  (6.65)  (5.15)  (4.22) 
Finance  0.990***  0.987***  0.995 
  ( 2.82)  ( 2.93)  ( 0.91) 
Export  0.620***  0.607***  0.647*** 
  ( 20.7)  ( 17.8)  ( 10.8) 
Innovation  0.507***  0.534***  0.490*** 
  ( 12.7)  ( 7.34)  ( 10.4) 
Industry concentration  1.044**  0.913  1.138** 
  (2.69)  ( 0.95)  (2.58) 
Industry entry rate  0.919  0.975  0.795 
  ( 0.56)  ( 0.13)  ( 0.90) 
Industry exit rate  4.028***  3.089***  6.633*** 
  (8.05)  (5.36)  (6.19) 
High level  0.626***  0.917**  0.503*** 
  ( 2.69)  ( 2.30)  ( 3.08) 
Middle level  0.709***  0.691***  0.699*** 
  ( 5.81)  ( 3.96)  ( 4.30) 
Local level  0.635***  0.659***  0.603*** 
  ( 6.54)  ( 4.80)  ( 4.49) 
Observations  175648  102210  73438 
Notes: 
a. Asymptotic standard errors are given in  parentheses 
b. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c. All specifications include time, sectoral and regional dummies 21 
d. Note that the coefficients in the above table give hazard ratio. Hence a coefficients greater 
(less) than one implies a higher (lower) hazard rate. For example, the hazard ratio of 0.659 on 
“Local level” in the second column of Table 3 suggests that a private firm that is politically 
affiliated  with  local  governments  have  a  34.1%  less  hazard  of  exit  than  an  otherwise 
equivalent firm with no political affiliation. 
 22 
Table 4 
Firm growth and political affiliation  
 
  Selectivity corrected  GMM 








Finance  0.00591***  0.0128***  0.00551***  0.0704***  0.0462***  0.0994*** 
  (6.98)  (5.09)  (4.93)  (8.02)  (3.99)  (7.38) 
Age   0.015***   0.015***   0.015***   0.0140***   0.0137***   0.0147*** 
  ( 14.8)  ( 5.37)  ( 11.3)  ( 13.4)  ( 9.97)  ( 9.21) 
Initial size   0.121***   0.157***   0.125***   0.134***   0.146***   0.119*** 
  ( 54.6)  ( 36.9)  ( 40.7)  ( 55.0)  ( 47.2)  ( 30.7) 
Innovation  0.0623***  0.569***  0.0589***  0.0926***  0.0689***  0.108*** 
  (5.78)  (16.5)  (3.52)  (8.48)  (3.92)  (7.70) 
Export  0.0707***  0.421***  0.0739***  0.0914***  0.0973***  0.0845*** 
  (11.3)  (27.5)  (9.19)  (18.7)  (16.6)  (9.54) 
Industry 
concentration 
 0.0129   0.0676*   0.0443*   0.0626   0.0776***  0.0429* 
  ( 0.92)  ( 1.76)  ( 1.96)  ( 0.35)  ( 2.66)  (1.90) 
High level  0.028***  0.025***  0.034**  0.0211***  0.017*  0.0257*** 
  (5.28)  (4.52)  (2.13)  (3.50)  (1.90)  (2.63) 
Middle level  0.016  0.008  0.0380  0.00190   0.00559  0.0128 
  (1.40)  (0.75)  (0.057)  (0.083)  ( 0.20)  (0.33) 
Local level  0.019*  0.011***  0.0253**  0.009***  0.0078***  0.0103*** 
  (1.77)  (3.88)  (2.82)  (4.22)  (3.12)  (2.70) 
p-value--  Sargan test        0.710  0.801  0.712 
Observations  251179  224636  145185  130186  75783  54403 
Notes: 
a.  Asymptotic t statistics are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include sectoral, regional and time dummies 
d.  All regressors are lagged  by one period. 
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Table 5 
Productivity growth and political affiliation  
   
  Selectivity corrected  GMM 








Finance   0.0031***  0.0036***  0.00217*  0.0142***  0.0116***  0.0165*** 
  (3.77)  (3.32)  (1.67)  (10.1)  (6.20)  (7.76) 
Age   0.0384***   0.0350***   0.0431***   0.0657***   0.0614***   0.0699*** 
  ( 39.4)  ( 27.9)  ( 28.0)  ( 43.8)  ( 31.6)  ( 30.0) 
Innovation  0.0853***  0.115***  0.0741***  0.217***  0.225***  0.180*** 
  (8.45)  (7.45)  (5.30)  (12.1)  (7.55)  (8.35) 
Export  0.0270***  0.0266***  0.0320***  0.0224***  0.0199***  0.0271*** 
  (4.63)  (3.72)  (3.20)  (3.92)  (2.80)  (2.70) 
Industry concentration  0.0211   0.00287  0.0302*   0.189***   0.194***   0.158*** 
  (1.55)  ( 0.13)  (1.66)  ( 6.48)  ( 3.83)  ( 4.52) 
Initial productivity   0.869***   0.877***   0.862***   0.142***   0.159***   0.129*** 
  ( 253)  ( 198)  ( 157)  ( 44.6)  ( 38.0)  ( 27.2) 
High level   0.017**   0.0281**  0.0012   0.0278***   0.063***   0.010*** 
  ( 2.87)  ( 2.35)  (0.067)  ( 11.9)  ( 8.53)  ( 7.97) 
Middle level   0.0237***   0.0261***   0.0204***   0.076***   0.0434***   0.0541*** 
  ( 5.08)  ( 4.21)  ( 2.89)  ( 13.5)  ( 8.73)  ( 10.9) 
Local level   0.0076*   0.0054   0.012*  0.016  0.012  0.075 
  ( 1.70)  ( 0.95)  ( 1.69)  (1.52)  (1.30)  (0.17) 
p-value--  Sargan test        0.453  0.670  0.332 
Observations  251179  145185  105994  130186  75783  54403 
 
Notes: 
a.  Asymptotic t statistics are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include sectoral, regional and time dummies 




















Middle  None 




The determinants of political connection: 
Marginal effects from probit regressions 
   
     
COEFFICIENT  Firm level 
variables only 
Adding 
regional and  
industrial 
variables 
     
Productivity  0.00704**  0.0203*** 
  (1.98)  (6.14) 
Size  0.0502***  0.0260*** 
  (39.0)  (20.8) 
Finance  0.00865***  0.00577*** 
  (11.0)  (7.60) 
Financial development      5.482*** 
    ( 22.0) 
Lawyers per population     0.000748** 
    ( 2.33) 
Intellectual property right     0.00466*** 
    ( 12.7) 
Financial competition     0.0330*** 
    ( 25.9) 
Labour intensive sector     0.0214*** 
    ( 8.75) 
Share of private sector     0.142*** 
    ( 17.3) 26 
Pseudo R squared  0.014  0.176 
     
Percent of correct 
predictions 
62.5%  79.2% 
Observations  106718  106718 
Notes: 
a.  Asymptotic t statistics are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include  time dummies. 